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Introduction 
It’s  a  particular  pleasure  to  be  with  you  this 
morning  at your  annual  convention.  I want  to  focus 
my  comments  today  on monetary  policy.  This  seems 
like  a  natural  subject  for  a  Federal  Reserve  Bank 
official to  address.  Some  of you  may  be  disappointed 
by  my  choice,  however,  since  there  are  a  number 
of  other  topics  I could  tackle  that  might  strike  you 
as more  pressing  such  as the  current  concern  about 
a possible  credit  crunch,  progress  toward  the  resolu- 
tion  of  the  problems  in  the  thrift  industry,  deposit 
insurance,  or prospective  changes  in our  banking  and 
financial  structure.  We  at  the  Federal  Reserve  are 
naturally  interested  in  all these  matters.  Our  most 
important  responsibility  at  the  Fed,  however,  is to 
manage  the  nation’s  monetary  system  and,  in  par- 
ticular,  the  rate  of  growth  in  the  supply  of  money. 
Moreover,  by  discharging  this  fundamental  respon- 
sibility  effectively  we  may  well  be  able  to  facilitate 
resolution  of  the  seemingly  more  immediate  issues 
I just  mentioned  as well  as others.  In fact,  it can  be 
argued  that  some  of our  more  immediate  problems, 
such  as the  thrift  crisis,  may  have  been  brought  on 
in part  by  past  monetary  policies  that  in  retrospect 
were  less  than  optimal. 
A  More  Useful  Conception  of 
Monetary  “Policy” 
The  first  thing  I want  to  stress  is the  time  frame 
I have  in mind  when  I talk  about  monetary  “policy.” 
When  many,  and  perhaps  most  people,  think  of the 
Fed  and  monetary  policy,  they  focus  almost  auto- 
matically  on  interest  rates  and  where  they  are 
headed  and  how  our  actions  may  affect  them  in the 
near  future.  Since  the  day-to-day  operating  lever  we 
use in conducting  monetary  policy  is the  federal  funds 
rate,  many  people  equate  changes  in the  funds  rate 
with  changes  in monetary  policy.  For  example,  the 
press  typically  refers  to  an  increase  in  the  rate  as  a 
“tightening”  of  monetary  policy. 
This  is  definitely  not  what  I have  in  mind  when 
I think  of monetary  policy,  and  I shall  argue  later  in 
my  remarks  that  equating  changes  in the  funds  rate 
and  other  money  market  indicators  with  changes  in 
monetary  policy  has  been  a particularly  misleading 
practice  and has contributed  to many  of the  problems 
we  have  experienced  over  the  last 30 years.  Instead, 
when  I speak  of monetary  policy,  I am talking  about 
both  the  longer-run  objective  the  Federal  Reserve 
is  trying  to  achieve  in  the  economy  through  its 
monetary  actions  and  the  timetable  and  set  of  pro- 
cedures  for  attaining  that  objective. 
To  understand  the  distinction  I am  making,  con- 
sider  the  setting  of  the  prime  rate  by  your  bank. 
Obviously,  the  “policy”  of  your  bank  is not  simply 
to  set  the  prime  rate  at  a certain  level.  Your  policy 
embraces  your  larger  goal  of achieving  a certain  rate 
of  return  on  assets  or  equity  over  a particular  time 
horizon.  To  help  in reaching  this  goal,  you  maintain 
the  prime  rate  at  a certain  spread  above  your  cost 
of funds.  Clearly,  changes  in the  prime  are just  part 
of a larger  set  of procedures  designed  to  achieve  the 
ultimate  goal  of  a target  return  on  assets  or  equity. 
Similarly,  changes  in the  funds  rate  have  to  be  con- 
sidered  in  the  context  of  the  larger  strategy  of 
monetary  policy. 
A  Brief Historical Review 
The  principal  questions  I  want  to  address  this 
morning  are  (1)  what  is  an  appropriate  monetary 
policy  for  the  Federal  Reserve  and  (2) how  far have 
we  come  in  developing  such  a policy?  I shall  begin 
with  a brief  review  of  the  major  monetary  develop- 
ments  over  the  last 30 years  and,  on  the  basis  of this 
review,  make  some  general  observations  about  how 
policy  has  worked  over  this  period  and  how  it  has 
affected  inflation  and  the  economy.  With  these 
generalizations  in mind,  I shall  then  summarize  my 
view  of an appropriate  monetary  policy  in the  sense 
in which  I have  just  defined  the  term  and  conclude 
with  an  assessment  of  the  progress  we  have  made 
in  putting  such  a policy  in  place. 
My  historical  review  necessarily  will be  very  brief 
and  oversimplified,  but  even  a quick  review  suggests 
some  strong  generalizations  about  an  appropriate 
monetary  policy.  Think  back  if you  will  to  the  late 
1960s  when  large  increases  in federal  spending  on 
social  programs  and  defense  put  strong  upward 
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sometimes  slow to let the  funds  rate  and other  short- 
term  interest  rates  rise  enough  to  reflect  these 
pressures.  Consequently,  money  growth  accelerated, 
which  resulted  in  a  sharp  increase  in  the  rate  of 
inflation.  The  System  eventually  responded.  to  the 
higher  inflation  by  pushing  the  funds  rate  up  over 
three  percentage  points  in  1969,  and  the  recession 
of  1970  followed. 
Roughly  this  same  sequence  was  repeated  two 
more  times  in  the  1970s.  In  1972,  an  expanding 
economy  put  upward  pressure  on interest  rates.  The 
Fed  allowed  the funds  rate to adjust upward  modestly 
before  the  end  of  the  year,  but  in  retrospect  the 
increase  was  not  enough  to  prevent  money  growth 
and  inflation  from  rising  strongly.  The  System 
responded  to  the  accelerating  rate  of  inflation  by 
raising  the  funds  rate  five percentage  points  in  1973, 
and  the  economy  again  fell  into  a  recession.  Of 
course,  the  rise  in  oil prices  during  this  period  un- 
doubtedly  affected  both  the  inflation  rate  and  the 
general  economy,  but  it seems  clear  with  the  benefit 
of hindsight  that  our failure  to let short-term  interest 
rates  rise  more  freely  in  1972  was  also  a factor  since 
it  made  a  much  sharper  increase  unavoidable  the 
following  year. 
The  third  episode,  and  one  I’m  sure  you  all 
remember  quite  well,  occurred  in the  late  1970s.  In 
this period  rapid  economic  growth  again put  upward 
pressure  on interest  rates,  yet  the funds  rate remained 
essentially  constant  from  late  1975  through  mid- 
1977.  Throughout  this period,  of course,  the  System 
was justifiably  concerned  about  the  lingering  effects 
of the  huge  increases  in oil prices  in  1973  and  1974, 
and  we  naturally  wanted  to  do  whatever  we  could 
with  monetary  policy  to  help  minimize  the  damage 
these  increases  might  inflict  on  the  economy.  Even 
so,  looking  back  it seems  evident  that  our reluctance 
to  let  the  funds  rate  adjust  upward  for  such  an  ex- 
tended  period  helped  set  the  stage  for  the  sharp 
acceleration  in both  the  rate  of growth  of the  money 
supply  and inflation  that  followed.  We  began  to raise 
the  funds  rate  in  late  1977  and  continued  to  raise 
it through  1978,  but  our  actions  came  too  late  and 
were  too  restrained.  Money  growth  remained  high 
and  inflation  continued  to accelerate.  Ultimately,  in 
a crisis atmosphere,  the funds rate moved  up by about 
eight  percentage  points  in late  1979  and  early  1980, 
and  the  relatively  mild  recession  of  1980  ensued. 
This  was  followed  by  a brief  recovery  and  then  by 
the  much  deeper  and  more  protracted  recession  of 
1981-1982,  which  was  very  costly  in terms  of  lost 
jobs  and  output.  About  the  only  good  thing  one  can 
say  about  the  performance  of  the  economy  in  the 
early  1980s  is  that  the  rate  of  inflation  was  cut 
roughly  in  half.  The  rate  remained  in  a range  of 3 
to 5 percent  throughout  the  remainder  of the  1980s. 
These  developments  in the  late  1960s  and  1970s 
highlighted  the  link between  excessive  money  growth 
and  inflation  and  led  to  a number  of changes  in our 
procedures  that  involved  setting  more  explicit  goals 
for the  growth  of the  money  supply  and  working  to 
control  this  growth  more  closely  in order  to achieve 
these  goals.  In  1970  the  FOMC  first  began  to  set 
explicit  short-run  targets  for  money  growth,  and  as 
the  decade  progressed  the  use  of the  money  supply 
as a target  became  more  firmly  institutionalized.  In 
1975,  in response  to a congressional  resolution,  we 
began  to  announce  quarterly  targets  for the  growth 
rates  of several  so-called  monetary  aggregates-the 
various  “M’s”  with  which  you  are  all familiar.  The 
Humphrey-Hawkins  Act  of  1978  improved  our pro- 
cedures  by requiring  us to set  money  growth  targets 
on  a  calendar-year  basis.  Earlier  we  had  set  four- 
quarter-ahead  targets  each quarter,  so that  by the time 
we reached  the  end  of a target  period  we were  already 
working  on  a  new  target  with  a  new  time  frame. 
These  steps  were  all in the right  direction,  but even 
after  Humphrey-Hawkins  was passed  there  was  still 
a flaw  in  the  targeting  procedure,  which  is  usually 
referred  to  as  the  “base  drift”  problem.  Base  drift 
arises  under  our procedure  because  the  base  for the 
target  set each  year  is the acwilevel  of the  monetary 
aggregate  in  the  preceding  period  rather  than  the 
taeet  level  in that  period.  Consequently,  any  target 
miss  in the  preceding  period  is forgiven  when  a new 
target  is set,  and  the  base  for the  new  target  “drifts” 
either  upward  or  downward.  Consequently,  the 
longer-term  growth  rate  of money  over  a period  of 
several  years  can  be well  above  any of the  individual 
annual  target  rates  if  the  actual  growth  rates  per- 
sistently  exceeded  the  target  rates.  This  is exactly 
what  happened  in the  late  1970s.  The  upward  base 
drift  in this  period,  along  with  our  tendency  to raise 
the  funds  rate  rather  gradually  when  money  growth 
first  accelerated  in  1977  and  1978,  were  major 
factors  contributing  to  the  subsequent  double-digit 
inflation. 
Some General Observations About Past Policy 
This  brief  review  of  events  over  the  last  three 
decades  points  to several  generalizations  which  have 
influenced  my  thinking  on  what  constitutes  an 
appropriate  monetary  policy.  The  first  and  most 
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rate  and  the  direction  of changes  in  the  funds  rate 
are not  reliable  indicators  of monetary  policy.  A par- 
ticular  level  of  the  rate  could  be  consistent  with  a 
relatively  restrictive  stance  or a relatively  easy  stance 
depending  on what  else is happening  in the economy 
and  the  financial  markets.  The  funds  rate  increased 
in  1968,  in  1972,  and  in  1977  and  1978.  Yet  in 
retrospect  it  is  clear  that  policy  in  each  of  these 
periods  was  not  too  tight  but  too  easy.  Conse- 
quently,  money  growth  accelerated. 
We  also  know  from  our  experiences  over  this 
period-if  we  did  not  know  it  before-that  rapid 
money  growth  inevitably  leads  to  an acceleration  of 
inflation.  Just  as  inevitably,  pressures  eventually 
mount  both  inside  and  outside  the  Fed  to  take 
aggressive  action  to  bring  this  inflation  under  con- 
trol.  In each  of the  three  episodes  I reviewed,  these 
actions  unfortunately  were  followed  by  recessions. 
Another  generalization  suggested  by our experience 
over  the  last  30  years-and  one  that  I believe  is ex- 
tremely  important-is  that  expansionary  monetary 
policies  and high rates  of inflation do not lead to faster 
economic  growth.  To  put  it in the  jargon  of econo- 
mists,  there  is  no  trade-off  between  inflation  and 
longer-run  economic  growth.  On  the  contrary,  per- 
sistently  high  rates  in inflation  have  generally  been 
associated  with  relatively  low rates  of real economic 
growth. 
A fourth  conclusion,  which  has  been  a major  dis- 
appointment  for me,  is that  the  development  of our 
monetary  targeting  procedures  beginning  in  the 
early  1970s  was  not  sufficient  to  prevent  us  from 
making  some  of the  same  policy  errors  in  the  late 
70s  we  had  made  twice  before  in the  preceding  15 
years  or so.  As I suggested  earlier,  upward  base  drift 
in our money  supply  targets  probably  contributed  to 
the  very  high  trend  growth  in the  monetary  aggre- 
gates  in the  late  70s.  And  our  reluctance  to  adjust 
the  funds  rate  upward  as promptly  as we might  have 
when  the  indications  of excessive  money  growth  and 
rising  inflation  first  became  available  was  probably 
also  a  factor.  Together  these  two  factors  largely 
neutralized  the  institutional  improvements  we  made 
in  this  period. 
A final  general  observation  suggested  by  our  ex- 
perience  over  the  last  30  years  is  that  despite  our 
strong  desire  at  the  Fed  throughout  this  period  to 
hold  inflation under  control,  the  record  unfortunately 
makes  it clear  that  we were  less than  fully successful. 
There  has  been  a noticeable  tendency,  on  average 
and  in  retrospect,  to  follow  policies  that  have 
allowed  the  price  level  to  creep  upward.  This  same 
tendency  has been  apparent  in many  other  industrial 
countries  over  the  same  period.  No  statistic  better 
illustrates  this  tendency  than  the&&Cd  increase  in 
the  price  level  since  1965.  Economists  have  devoted 
much  effort  in recent  years  to  trying  to  understand 
the  reason  for  this  experience. 
One  popular  explanation  in the  academic  literature, 
sometimes  referred  to  as  the  “time  inconsistency” 
problem  (or  in  layman’s  terms,  “changing  your 
mind”),  runs  along  the  following  lines.  Suppose  that 
a central  bank  commits  itself  to  an  anti-inflationary 
monetary  policy  and  that  this  commitment  is cred- 
ible  to  the  public.  The  bank  may  well  have  every 
intention  of  fulfilling  this  promise  at  the  time  it  is 
made.  (I am assuming  here  that the bank  is not legally 
or constitutionally  bound  to fulfill its commitment.) 
Subsequently,  however,  the  bank  will  see  that  the 
credibility  of its  promise  gives  it  an  opportunity  to 
stimulate  real  economic  activity  temporarily  by  sur- 
prising  the public  with  an unexpectedly  expansionary 
policy-that  is,  an  unexpected  acceleration  in  the 
growth  of the  money  supply.  The  bank  may  find  it 
exceedingly  difficult  to  resist  the  temptation  to  ex- 
ploit  this  opportunity  even  if it wishes  to keep  infla- 
tion  low.  To  the  extent  that  central  banks  succumb 
to this temptation  in practice,  their  behavior,  in com- 
bination  with  the  public’s ability to form  expectations 
of policy  actions  that  are  correct  on  average,  inevit- 
ably  leads  to  inflation.  The  extent  to  which  this 
notion  applies  to  our  own  experience  in the  United 
States  is not  entirely  clear yet,  but  the  idea probably 
deserves  further  thought  and  research. 
A second  explanation  for the  apparent  inflationary 
tendency  in  our  policy  over  time  is  the  one-sided 
political pressures  brought  to bear  on policy.  Govern- 
ment  officials  and  others  routinely  exhort  the  Fed 
to follow “easier” policies,  by which  they  mean  lower 
short-term  interest  rates.  These  exhortations  arise 
because  many  people  believe  (1)  that  the  Fed  can 
“trade  off’ a higher  rate of inflation for more  economic 
growth  and  (2)  that  the  Fed  determines  the  rate  of 
interest  independently  of  the  rate  of  inflation  and 
other  economic  conditions.  As  I have  already  sug- 
gested,  both  these  beliefs  strike  me  as  misguided. 
A particularly  damaging  misperception  among  some 
government  leaders  is  the  one  I  mentioned  at  the 
beginning  of my  remarks:  namely,  that  a rise  in the 
federal  funds  rate  represents  a “tighter”  monetary 
policy.  As  the  experience  of the  1960s  and  1970s 
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has frequently  led observers  to conclude  that  the  Fed 
is following  an excessively  “tight”  policy  when  in fact 
the  reverse  has  been  true. 
Let  me state  and then  underline  my conviction  that 
the  FOMC  has  never  conxiouly  made  decisions  on 
the  basis  of political  considerations.  Political  pres- 
sures  are  always  present,  however,  and  it  seems 
possible  that  at times  these  pressures  may  have  had 
some  effect  on policy  at the  margin.  In any case,  the 
key  point  is  not  why  monetary  policy  has  had  an 
inflationary  tendency  over  the  last three  decades,  but 
that  in fact  it has  had  this  tendency,  and  I think  it 
would  be  hard  for  anyone  to  dispute  this  point. 
Suggestions for Improving Monetary  Policy 
In  view  of  our  experience  over  the  last  three 
decades,  what  can we do to improve  monetary  policy 
in the  longer-run,  strategic  context  I discussed  at the 
beginning  of  my  comments?  As  I  see  it,  the  most 
important  lessons  from  our  experience  over  this 
period  are  that  price  stability  should  be  the  primary 
objective  of  monetary  policy  and  that  a  specific 
timetable  should  be  set  for achieving  it. As many  of 
you  know,  Congressman  Stephen  Neal,  Chairman 
of the  Subcommittee  on Domestic  Monetary  Policy 
of the  House  Committee  on  Banking,  Finance,  and 
Urban  Affairs, has introduced  a Resolution  that  would 
instruct  the  Fed  to make  price  stability  its overriding 
goal  and  direct  the  Fed  to  achieve  this  goal  within 
five years.  I recently  testified-in  favor  of this  Resolu- 
tion,  as  did  Chairman  Greenspan  and  three  other 
Federal  Reserve  Bank  presidents. 
A  further  lesson  from  our  experience  is  that  our 
procedures  for controlling  the  growth  of the  money 
supply  need  to  be  improved.  My  own  view  is  that 
setting  targets  for money  growth  that  cover  periods 
not  of just  one  year  but  several  years  would  help  us 
greatly  in  our  efforts  to  achieve  longer-run  price 
stability.  Obviously,  we  must  then  hit  the  targets 
consistently.  Persistent  overshoots  of  the  annual 
targets  must  not  be  allowed  to  cumulate  as  hap- 
pened  in the  late  1970s.  A big  step  forward  in this 
regard  is the  recent  development  of a statistical  model 
by the  staff of the  Board  of Governors  that  provides 
an  early  warning  to  the  FOMC  as  to  whether  its 
policies  are working  to increase  longer-run  inflationary 
pressures  or decrease  them.  This  is the  so-called  “P* 
model”  that  you’ve  probably  seen  discussed  in  the 
financial  press.  In  my  judgment,  a  multi-year  pro- 
cedure  for  setting  money  supply  targets  guided  by 
something  like the  P’  model  would  provide  a reliable 
and powerful  strategic  framework  for moving  toward 
full  price  stability. 
A final lesson  suggested  by  our  experience  is that 
if we  want  to  hit  our  monetary  targets  and  achieve 
price  stability,  we will have  to be  prepared  to adjust 
the  federal  funds  rate  (or  whatever  other  operating 
instrument  we  may  be  using)  promptly  at  the  first 
signs  of excessive  money  growth  and  incipient  infla- 
tion.  I call  this  willingness  to  move  the  funds  rate 
up  promptly  “erring  on  the  side  of restrictiveness.” 
The  1960s  and  70s  suggest  that  the  risks  of policy 
errors  are asymmetric.  Increases  in the funds  rate can 
be  reversed  quickly  if they  turn  out  to  be  inappro- 
priate.  In  contrast,  failure  to  let  the  funds  rate  rise 
in a period  when  market  forces  are  naturally  putting 
upward  pressure  on  interest  rates  can  raise  inflation 
expectations  and  put  even  greater  upward  pressure 
on rates.  As this process  proceeds,  an ever-increasing 
upward  adjustment  in  the  funds  rate  becomes 
necessary  to  bring  it  in  line  with  market  forces.  In 
this  situation  we  risk  losing  control  of  the  rate  of 
growth  in money  and  inflation.  In short,  we  need  to 
act be&m inflation  gets  out  of hand  rather  than  after. 
Prospects for Monetary  Policy 
My greatest  hope  is that  a policy  of the  kind  1 have 
just  outlined  will be  put  in place  soon.  I am  gener- 
ally  optimistic  regarding  the  prospects  for  such  an 
outcome,  although  realism  requires  a note  of caution. 
My optimism  reflects positive  recent  developments 
in each  of the  three  areas  I just  reviewed.  Firs,  there 
is a growing  consensus  within  the  Federal  Reserve 
System  and among  members  of the  FOMC  that price 
stability  should  be  the  overriding  goal  of monetary 
policy.  I can say without  qualification  that,  as a group, 
the  current  members  of the  FOMC  and  nonvoting 
presidents  are  the  most  dedicated  inflation  fighters 
I have  seen  since  I have  been  associated  with  the 
Committee.  Moreover,  the  view  that  price  stability 
should  be  the  primary  goal  of  monetary  policy  is 
now  shared  by  at least  some  members  of Congress. 
The  introduction  of  the  Neal  Resolution  and  the 
public  discussion  of  its  provisions  represent  con- 
siderable  progress,  even  if  the  Resolution  is  not 
enacted  in  the  near-term  future.  Second,  while  we 
have  not  changed  our  procedures  for setting  annual 
money  supply  targets,  we are paying  more  attention 
to  longer-run  money  growth  and  its  implication  for 
inflation.  The  development  of the  P’  model  I men- 
tioned  earlier  reflects  this emphasis.  Fina&  I believe 
there  is  a growing  recognition  within  the  Fed  that 
the  goal  of price  stability  requires  us  to  adjust  the 
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promptly  before inflation  accelerates.  Twice  in  the 
1980s-in  1984  and  again  in  late  1988  and  early 
1989-we  let  the  funds  rate  increase  substantially 
even  though  inflation  was  not  rising  rapidly  at  the 
time.  Each  of these  times  we were  criticized  by some 
for being  too  “restrictive,”  but  I am  convinced  that 
these  actions  contributed  to  the  relatively  stable 
inflation  and surprisingly  persistent  economic  growth 
we  have  enjoyed  over  the  last  seven  years. 
Having  said  this,  I  have  to  acknowledge  in  all 
candor  that  my  optimism  regarding  our  ability  to 
pursue  a  policy  aimed  at  achieving  true  price  sta- 
bility  is  a  cautious  optimism  at  this  point.  It  is 
cautious  because  a large  part  of  the  general  public 
and  many  government  leaders  are  still  relatively 
unconcerned  about  inflation.  I was  shocked  to  read 
of  a  recent  poll  showing  that  82  percent  of  the 
members  of  the  National  Association  of  Business 
Economists  do  not  favor  the  objectives  of the  Neal 
Resolution.  The  majority  of those  surveyed  appar- 
ently  believe  that  the  cost  of  reducing  inflation 
below  its current  4 to  5 percent  trend  rate  would  be 
too  great  because  the  public  has  become  so  accus- 
tomed  to  inflation  at about  this  rate.  I cannot  agree 
with  this  conclusion.  Nothing  in our  experience  over 
the  last  30  years  indicates  that  we  can  maintain 
inflation  at a steady  4 to  5 percent  rate  indefinitely. 
If we  accept  a 4 to  5 percent  rate  as tolerable,  I am 
confident  it will be  only  a matter  of time  before  we 
are faced  with  a much  higher  rate.  Further,  I believe 
that  a gradual  reduction  in the  rate  over  a relatively 
long  but  well-defined  period  of  time  could  be  ac- 
complished  without  unacceptable  costs  to  the 
economy. 
In  conclusion,  the  Federal  Reserve  has  made 
considerable  progress  toward  developing  and  imple- 
menting  an  appropriate  monetary  policy  aimed  at 
attaining  price  stability  and  the  strong  growth  in 
production  and jobs  that  go with  it.  We  still  have  a 
great  deal  of work  to  do  in  developing  public  and 
Congressional  support  for this  policy,  however,  and 
we  obviously  must  succeed  in  this  effort  because 
without  this  support  the  policy  itself  will surely  fail. 
I hope  that  you  will  support  our  efforts  to  achieve 
this  important  goal. 
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